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REBUILDING GERMANY’S CHILDREN:
THE NAZI INDOCTRINATION AND 
POSTWAR REEDUCATION OF THE 
HITLER YOUTH
Elizabeth Fox 
Introduction
On May 8, 1945, as the Allies advanced deep into German 
territory, the Third Reich disintegrated. In the aftermath of 
World War II, the horrors of the Nazi dictatorship were fully 
exposed when the Nazi political foundations finally crumbled, 
reflecting the wreckage of most German cities, such as Berlin. 
German civilians were left to rebuild their country, their lives,
and the German psyche.  As they looked upon the debris of 
their homes and towns, the Germans were traumatized, lost, and 
helpless; the once proud and mighty Nazi national identity was 
shattered.  As a result, they turned to the German youth 
population to shoulder the great burdens of reconstruction, the 
majority of whom had participated in the Hitler Youth and were 
also psychologically devastated and lost. Günter Grass, former 
Hitler Youth member of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frunds-
berg, once reflected on having been in the Hitler Youth 
generation of Germany, noting that he felt “too young to have 
been a Nazi, but old enough to have been formed by the Nazi 
regime.”1 Despite having been formerly molded and shaped by 
Nazi indoctrination, Germany’s youth became the best hope for 
1 Quoted in Jan-Werner Müller, Another Country: German 
Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000), 10.  
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the future and, through reeducation and democratization, the 
means through which Nazi principles could be extricated from 
the German consciousness. In the author’s opinion, the ac-
counts of former Hitler Youth members and other German 
adolescents do, in fact, attest to the shift towards democratiza-
tion.  One of the postwar tasks at hand was the reconstruction 
of the German ideology, especially that of the youth, to enable 
this formerly proud people to come to terms with events during 
the war and how best to move forward.  The rebuilding of 
Germany’s children was the daunting mission facing the Allies 
and German citizens.
This essay will examine the success or failure of democra-
tization in Germany after World War II through an examination 
of postwar memoirs of former Hitler Youth members, as well 
as an oral history interview with a former member, Erich 
Neumeier [Fig. 1].  It explores whether or not those who looked 
back on their participation in the Hitler Youth continued to base 
their lives on the Nazi ideals with which they had been in-
doctrinated or if their reeducation during the rebuilding of 
Germany after World War II was a success. While the brain-
washing of German adolescents was accomplished through the 
regime’s schooling, physical training, and Fascist pageantry of 
the Hitler Youth organization, this essay will argue that the 
ultimate disintegration of Germany at the end of the war and in 
the postwar period, combined with the Allied efforts at postwar 
reeducation and democratization, successfully influenced a shift 
away from Nazi ideals; the formerly indoctrinated youth were 
the first to be influenced.  In the wake of the indisputable 
failure and disillusionment of the Germans, Nazi principles 
simply could not withstand the impending wave of democracy 
that began to affect postwar Germany.  
Notes on the Evidence
In order to discuss contextually the Hitler Youth and the 
Allied postwar reeducation in Germany, one must describe the 
methodology undergirding the evidence used in this essay. The
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Figure 1. Portion of Erich Neumeier Interview, page 1. 
Conducted on April 6, 2016.
majority of primary and secondary sources provide comprehen-
sive histories on how both the processes of Nazi indoctrination 
and Allied postwar reeducation policies shaped the ideologies 
of German youths. However, various historical accounts have 
placed little emphasis on critically evaluating the postwar 
memories of former Nazi youths. Debates on whether democra-
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tization was extremely successful have occurred amongst 
historians. When discussing studies made by German scholars 
such as James Tent decades after the postwar period, historian 
Jaimey Fisher claims they did not grasp the impact of reeduca-
tion in its cultural and social context; instead “these studies 
generally focus on (re)educational policy and neglect the wider 
public sphere debates about generation and ‘the German youth’ 
as well as their consequences for German culture and national 
identity more generally.”2 Konrad Jarausch also agrees with 
Fisher that postwar discussion and analysis have in the past 
focused on the history rather than addressing the question of 
democratization. He argues that the problematic aspects of the 
entire process were largely ignored by Whig history, which 
emphasized the optimistic long-term success (albeit a signifi-
cant aspect of democratization) rather than perspectives of the 
process at the time.3 With respect to the views of these histori-
ans, attempts will be made to trace what democratization meant 
to German youths by analyzing the memories and perceptions 
of former Hitler Youth members. 
The methodology in this essay places primary importance 
upon tracing the postwar memory of German youths and 
creating a thoughtful analysis of their narratives. The problem 
underlying most of these postwar memories, mainly those of 
Erich Neumeier, is their silence concerning their participation 
in furthering the Nazi cause as Hitler Youth members, as well 
as their roles and thoughts during the democratization process 
that transformed post-1945 Germany. For instance, in my 
interviews with Neumeier, not once did he comment on Hitler, 
anti-Semitism, or the treatment of the Jews. Former Hitler 
Youth members such as Neumeier, Alfons Heck, and Günter 
2 Jaimey Fisher, Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, 
and Reconstruction After the Second World War (Detriot: Wayne 
State University Press, 2007), 15. 
3 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 
1945-1995, trans. Brandon Hunziker (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 131.
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Grass indicate that they viewed their experience in the youth 
organizations as times of social fellowship, rather than Nazi 
indoctrination; this leads to the question, in Neumeier’s case at 
least, whether or not his silence is possibly still a remnant of 
postwar guilt, shame, and denial manifesting itself. A number 
of sociological studies have deeply analyzed the problem of 
silence that afflicted postwar Germany regarding Nazi atroci-
ties. In the article “Towards a Science of Silence: The Conse-
quences of Leaving a Memory Unsaid,” this type of postwar 
silence is termed by sociologists as mnemonic silence, meaning 
“the absence of expressing a memory,” whether intentional or 
unintentional, overt or covert.4 It shows that silence sometimes 
does not mean actual forgetting but the act of trying to forget. 
The article categorizes this silence as “refusing to remember 
overtly while remembering covertly”; and it is perhaps done by 
Neumeier as he is justifying his Hitler Youth experience and 
innocence as a young naïve man who never got to fully 
participate in democratization due to his move to America. In 
this category, deception can be involved, but the motivations in 
refusing to remember can occur because “speakers are tuning 
what they say to the perceived attitudes or expectations of their 
audience, articulating some aspects of their memory while 
leaving others unmentioned.”5 The article also mentions the 
rebound effect, in which intentional silences may not elicit 
greater forgetting, but ironically “can actually make speakers 
more likely to remember the suppressed material in the future 
4 Charles B. Stone, et al., “Towards a Science of Silence: The 
Consequences of Leaving a Memory Unsaid,” Perspectives on 
Psychological Science 7, no. 1 (2012): 39. 
5 Ibid., 41. While I do not doubt Neumeier gave a true account 
of his life in the Hitler Youth based on what he experienced and 
perceived as a young boy (since he was not mature enough to 
realize the consequences of his participation), it is possible that he 
failed to acknowledge or willingly admit how he felt about Nazi 
indoctrination in the Hitler Youth after decades of realizing the 
extent of Nazi atrocities. 
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rather than to forget it.”6 This explains how postwar accounts 
like those of Alfons Heck and Günter Grass are created and 
analyzed years after the postwar period, the time when they 
remained silent in order to focus on finding stability in post-
WWII Germany.  Sociologists Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger 
similarly argue that “the passage of time may in itself increase 
the probability of finding [overt] silence as witnesses pass away 
or grow old, and collectives grow bored or tired.”7 Silence
according to them is a coping mechanism for acknowledging 
and remembering the past. Thus, former Nazi German youths 
have recently sought to recollect and write down their postwar 
experiences years later, as a way of at least claiming some 
responsibility for their actions—”keeping completely silent 
about certain issues is increasingly becoming a non-option for 
many nations [i.e. Germany].”8 Overall, these sources, includ-
ing the new interview, further this essay’s analysis of how 
postwar memory is analyzed in terms of the history of the 
Hitler Youth and the democratization process in post-1945
Germany. 
Hitler Youth Background and Indoctrination
In 1926, Nazi politician Kurt Gruber successfully re-
vamped Hitler’s official youth organization led by Baldur von
Shirach, giving it the title Hitlerjugend. The activities and 
involvement of the Hitler Youth can be summarized in three 
main goals: “to mobilize and to discipline an entire generation 
of German youth in the spirit of National Socialism; to loosen 
6 Ibid., 44.
7 Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Chana Teeger, “Unpacking the 
Unspoken: Silence in Collective Memory and Forgetting,” Social 
Forces 88, no. 3 (March 2010): 1110. 
8 Ibid., 1104.
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their ties to the Church, the family, and the past; to inculcate the 
ideal that the State was everything and the individual nothing.”9
The Hitler Youth can be described as a social organization 
with activities that required physical fitness and military 
instruction. This obligation involved participation in athletic 
games, which indirectly introduced youth to actual military 
operations and strategies. In an oral interview conducted by this 
author, Erich Neumeier, a former member of both the Jungvolk 
and the Hitlerjugend, stated that he remembered participating in 
sports activities as well as constructing and flying gliders.  In 
his written description, he compares his time in both organiza-
tions, which he claimed were similar to the Boy Scouts10:
I was in the young volk at 10 years, Hitler Youth at 14 
years.  Nearly 95% joined both organizations.  When 
you wanted to belong, you joined.  I did not have a rank.  
I was just a member.  In young volk, we had weekly 
meeting, had sport [running, jumping] and building 
moder [model] glider airplanes. . . . I did not feel that I 
was weaned from my family.  
I joined the “pilot” Hitler Youth section.  My fondest 
memory were learn how to fly a glider. . . . I liked to fly 
tremendously.  There were other sections of Hitler 
Youth; . . . you were free to choose your group after 
changing from young volk to Hitler Youth at 14 years.11
9 Craig W.H. Luther, Blood and Honor: The History of the 12th
SS Panzer Division, “Hitler Youth,” 1943-1945 (San Jose: R. 
James Bender Publishing, 1987), 13. 
10 Erich Neumeier, interviewed by Elizabeth Fox, April 6, 
2016, 1. Neumeier was born in 1927 in Ingolstadt, Germany just 
outside of Munich on the Danube River. This interview represents 
a credible account of his experiences in and perceptions of the 
Hitler Youth before and during the war, as well as his perception 
of the postwar reconstruction, democratization, and reeducation 
process. Neumeier is a friend of Elizabeth’s grandfather.
11 Ibid., 1-2.
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In essence, the Hitlerjugend became an important organi-
zation that indirectly trained these young men into becoming 
Nazi soldiers and fighting machines. The Nazi Schutzstaffel
(Elite Guard or SS) was primarily responsible for supporting 
and recruiting young boys from the Hitler Youth, serving as a 
connection for members, and, in fact, manipulating them to 
enter into SS positions. The SS “fed its insatiable thirst for 
power and its penetration into the collective mind and social 
fabric by replenishing its personnel from the politically condi-
tioned HJ [Hitlerjugend].”12
The Hitler Youth’s education on Nazi principles became 
the quintessential foundation of the organization that shaped the 
activities and training of its members. In addition to teaching 
about the race and ideologies of enemies, such as Jews and 
Communists, instruction emphasized German history (from its 
modern history in 1871 up to the humiliating end of World War 
I) and the life of Hitler.  Their most important handbook, which 
gave an overview of those Nazi principles, was entitled The 
Nazi Primer; in it, the goals of the Hitler Youth (“character 
building, physical training, and training in the National Social-
ist worldview”) clearly echoed the ideals emphasized by Nazi 
leadership.13 The Primer outlined complex ideas pertaining to 
German population and culture that are ultra-nationalist in 
attitude.  For instance, the Primer emphasized the need for 
racial purification in the German community, which was 
presently in danger of creating impure variations in races (or 
“hybrids”)—therefore, “a Jew who, during the ‘System Time,’ 
has assumed a German name and adopted the Christian belief is 
and remains a Jew.”14 In this way, it advocated for the preserva-
12 Gerhard Rempel, Hitler’s Children: The Hitler Youth and the 
SS (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 257.
13 Harwood L. Childs (trans.), William E. Dodd (comm.), The 
Nazi Primer: Official Handbook for Schooling the Hitler Youth
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938), xix. 
14 Ibid., 13. “System time” refers to the period of the Weimar 
Republic between 1918 and 1933.
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tion of the Aryan race, the most perfect civilization in the 
world, from mixed, abnormal peoples like the Jews, who seek 
to corrupt them and the natural order of the universe. This racial 
concept was a hidden rejection of democracy that instead 
upheld National Socialism as a suitable ideology in creating the 
pure, rather than individualistic, German state. William E. 
Dodd, the former U.S. ambassador to Germany from 1933-
1937, effectively summarized the overall significance of this 
indoctrination as “preparing the way for a Nazified world 
where all freedom of the individual, of education, and of the 
churches is to be totally suppressed.”15
These Nazi ideals were espoused by the German youth 
who separated themselves from their traditionally conservative 
moral guides—namely the church, school, and family unit. 
Thus, the Hitler Youth became a modern organization that 
appealed to independent young minds, as autonomy was 
granted to them as well as the “opportunity for young people to 
be respected and responsible.”16 For example, parental consent 
was not required to join the SS Panzer Division or the Hitler 
Youth.  Additionally, membership into these organizations 
eventually became mandatory, breaching the voice of parental 
authority and replacing it with that of the State in the guise of 
youthful rights of independence.  This sparked an intergenera-
tional conflict, specifically between the older generation of the 
Weimar Republic and the new, young generation of Nazis. A
former enthusiastic member of the Hitlerjugend, Alfons Heck, 
was driven to the Hitler Youth organization as a ten-year-old 
due to his “crav[ing] for action” and for freedom from respon-
sibilities.17 Similarly, devoted Jungvolk member Eberhard 
15 Ibid., 280.
16 Michael H. Kater, Hitler Youth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 1.  
17 Alfons Heck, A Child of Hitler: Germany in the Days When 
God Wore a Swastika (Phoenix: Renaissance House Publishers, 
1985), 9.  
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Weinbrenner learned from his teacher that “by resisting his 
parents he exhibited true Heldenmut [heroic courage].”18
The Hitler Youth also promoted itself as an organization of 
opportunity for all those of different backgrounds. The organi-
zation’s members were rewarded based on merit rather than 
social standing. In their immaturity, selfishness, and ignorance, 
these young boys sought power and strength over other children 
as they attempted to climb the ranks in their organization and 
be rewarded for their military and athletic prowess. In spite of 
this desire for Nazi power and leadership, the majority of the 
Hitler Youth, primarily its youngest members, were attracted to 
join the organization for the camaraderie and Fascist pageantry, 
normalizing the organization and its purpose. During his time in 
the Hitler Youth, Günter Grass reveled in this youthful fellow-
ship without question: “The wishful thought of [the Hitler 
Youth] slogan, Youth Must Be Led by Youth! was backed by 
promises of overnight hikes and other outdoor activities in the 
woods along the beach.”19 Erich Neumeier claimed that he had 
“a happy childhood, playing soocker [sic], swimming in the 
Danube, exploring the neighborhood park. . . .  As a young boy, 
I heard from my father, actually just good news.  My father had 
work, our family had more than enough to eat.  Germany was 
rising industrulic [sic].  I would say [I was] happy and proud to 
be a glider training pilot [in the Hitler Youth].” 20 Neumeier 
further expressed his disinterest in Nazi politics during his 
times in the Jungvolk and Hitler Youth, commenting on the fact 
that he never discovered the negative aspects of Nazism (i.e. 
18 Frederic C. Tubach, German Voices: Memories of Life Dur-
ing Hitler’s Third Reich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2011), 106. Weinbrenner had frequently rebelled from his 
Protestant parents, who were opposed to National Socialism, 
another example of intergenerational conflict.
19 Günter Grass, Peeling the Onion, trans. Michael Henry Heim 
(Orlando: A Harvest Book, Harcourt, Inc., 2007), 20. 
20 Neumeier, “Interview,” 2.
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anti-Semitism).21 To most German youths, their required duty 
as German citizens was to participate in the Hitler Youth—
there was no scrutiny of their actions since they did not 
understand the hidden political implications of the Nazism they 
naively practiced. In essence, as Alfons Heck reflected, 
“Children are too immature to question the veracity of what 
they are taught by their educators.”22 Like many of his peers, 
Neumeier did not fully realize the implications of his actions, 
but was just happy to be a child who “belonged” in a social 
organization. This illustrates the brilliance of the Nazi estab-
lishment in indoctrinating youth.  
Other postwar accounts reveal the realistic tensions of 
participation in the organization. Ilse Koehn, a former member 
of the German Girl’s League, Jungmaedel, faced hardships in 
her organization, providing a different story regarding her 
involvement as a half-Jewish girl in the Hitler Youth. Koehn’s 
identity as a Mischling (mixed-blood) was a hidden but 
common situation amongst other former members. In a classi-
fied document titled “Expulsion of A Mischlinge from the 
Hitler Youth” from the Archives of the Wiener Library in 
London, correspondence and orders from the Chief of the 
NDSAP Personnel Office detail the investigation into whether 
or not the two sons of Hildegard Becker should continue 
membership in the Hitler Youth when it was discovered while 
undergoing divorce proceedings that Becker’s mother had a 
Jewish identity.23 In spite of Becker’s declaration that she was 
only half-Jewish and that she “obviously tried hard to prevent 
expulsion of her sons,” the NDSAP officials rejected the boys’ 
21 Ibid. 
22 Heck, Child of Hitler, 3. 
23 “Expulsion of a Mischlinge From The Hitler Youth. The 
'Final Solution' (September 1939-May 1945): 'Mischlinge', Mixed 
Marriages, Non-Aryans, Racial Disgrace. Eyewitness Accounts.”
July 1938 to January 1939. Archives of the Wiener Library, 
London. The Wiener Library, London, United Kingdom. Archives 
Unbound. Web. 15 Mar. 2016.
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continued membership in the Hitler Youth, “even if they were 
only 1/8 part Jewish.”24 The situation with Becker and her sons 
reflects the danger of being discovered, even with the smallest 
remnants of Jewish ancestry.  Such threat of discovery could 
affect the most loyal Hitler Youth members, as seen in the fear 
of Ilse Koehn and her family. Koehn joined the Jungmaedel
because her friends had told her “how much fun they had, 
singing and playing all kinds of games”; the real function of 
these activities, however, was to instruct these girls on Nazi 
philosophy. 25 In one harsh situation, Koehn was forced along 
with thousands of Berlin children to evacuate to East Prussia, 
when in fact they were sent to Czechoslovakia without the 
knowledge of their families; there, Hitler Youth dignitaries, 
including Baldur von Schirach, welcomed them.26 These girls 
were told to lie in their letters to their parents that they were 
safely secure in their area when in actuality they lived in cruel, 
strict, and unfair conditions. This situation focused on forming 
the German boys and girls into effective Nazi leaders who 
should follow orders regardless of the circumstances. 
Overall, while the Hitler Youth organizations had success 
in the indoctrination of the youth toward Nazism, it was later 
discovered that there were hidden tensions that were revealed in 
the aftermath of the war. Many children were affected by the 
cruel, unjust exploitation of the Hitler Youth organization. As 
Gerhard Rempel remarks, members of the Hitler Youth were “a
generation of misguided idealists. Hitler’s children demonstrat-
ed a youthful capacity for fidelity. That loyalty was abused.”27
The transformative experiences and continuous blind loyalty of 
the Hitler Youth members to the Third Reich was put to the test 
when democratization took control of Germany in the postwar 
period. 
24 Ibid.
25 Ilse Koehn, Mischling, Second Degree: My Childhood in 
Germany (New York: Greenwillow Books, 1977), 8.  
26 Ibid., 47. 
27 Rempel, Hitler’s Children, 262.
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Stages of Reeducation: 
Demilitarization, Denazification, Democratization
The collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945 abruptly ended Na-
zi indoctrination. In an attempt to salvage the remnants of 
German society and reduce the long-term trauma felt by the 
German population, the Allies implemented stages for what 
they hoped would be successful reeducation leading to democ-
ratization. The Allies targeted the youth as the bulwark upon 
which Western Germany (also the subsequent new Bonn 
Republic) could reconstruct and once again be successfully 
integrated into Western society. The phase of demilitarization 
divided Germany into zones controlled by the United States, 
Great Britain, France, and Russia. Under foreign Allied 
occupation, Germany was required to eliminate Nazi military 
organizations like the Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS, and Volkssturm
militia. German soldiers willingly underwent this demilitariza-
tion process for “fear of being captured, especially by the 
Russians, as well as the urge to make their way home unrecog-
nized.”28 This act of capitulation largely contrasted with the 
Nazi militant values and mindset of the Hitler Youth, marking 
the first turn for many from militarization to civility. 
Denazification became an essential phase in eradicating 
Nazi organizations and culture that contained elements of 
Fascism. In October 1945, the Allied Control Council issued its 
eighth law providing legal ramifications for denazification 
measures. These measures effectively “dissolved the 
N.D.S.A.P., its formations, and its affiliated organizations, of 
which some sixty-two were enumerated, making it illegal to 
revive the Party, either under its old name or a new one, and 
providing for the confiscation of the Party’s assets, property, 
28 Jarausch, After Hitler, 23.  The Germans also desired to have 
a normal and peaceful civilian life when leaving the frontlines, 
which made disarmament and demobilization easier. 
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files and documents.”29 Additionally, German businesses and 
industries were “prohibited from employing former Party 
Members in any but the lowest positions,” in order to remove 
former members from professional society and reduce their 
influence.30 Censorship was also placed on Nazi films, newspa-
pers, and other media, gradually becoming replaced by its 
American alternatives, such as the newspaper Die Neue 
Zeitung. One specific Allied attempt of censorship occurred in 
German cinema, in which a 1951 film titled Die Sünderin (The 
Sinner) in 1951 told the story of a woman who resorts to 
prostitution and later commits suicide.31 The film provoked 
uproar in the Protestant and Catholic churches that protested 
against the film’s immoral themes. Through such critical
involvement, the church, once a traditional enemy of the Hitler 
Youth, became an institutional authority whose mission was to 
help rebuild postwar Germany based on conservative values. 
As a result, “by the beginning of the Bonn Republic, these well-
entrenched interests dominated the process of social and 
cultural reconstruction.”32
Although the majority of Nazi control was effectively 
eliminated, historian Konrad Jarausch argues that denazifica-
tion was largely unsuccessful in the short term. Denazification
boards failed to eradicate most former Nazis from professional 
life, which, to be sure, was a difficult and impractical goal to 
attain in the short term; they also failed to convince them of 
29 “Europe 1945: Number 2: Germany Under Allied Occupa-
tion (As Mirrored In The German Press). Wiener Library Publica-
tions,” October to December 1945 (Archives of the Wiener
Library, London, The Wiener Library, London, United Kingdom), 
Archives Unbound, 4. 
30 Ibid.
31 Heidi Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany: 
Reconstructing National Identity After Hitler (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 92. 
32 Ibid., 93.
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their collective responsibility in the Holocaust.33 The bureau-
cratic process of removing ardent Nazis from officer positions 
and finding new appropriate officers was slow and unpopular 
amongst the German masses. One mayor in Hamburg claimed 
that removing former Nazi and SS members would lead to a 
“class of disgruntled and sacked ex-Party members” that would 
be “dangerous, ill-advised and a threat to law and order”; he 
also rejected “employment of proven anti-Fascists and former 
concentration camp inmates as contrary to the best interests of 
democratic administration.”34 In spite of such claims and initial 
backlash, local governments, primarily in West Germany, 
underwent tremendous efforts to purge Nazis from society and 
carry out their own programs of denazification. The denazifica-
tion processes differed with regards to Soviet-controlled areas 
versus those of the Western Allies—the Soviets using their own 
brand of indoctrination and brutality—but such processes were 
underway in all areas of Germany. 
Democratization benefited from the reeducation of the 
postwar German youth, primarily through the reorganization of 
the schools. Upon their reopening, schools faced problems such 
as the lack of textbooks approved to replace those that empha-
sized Nazi propaganda, like The Nazi Primer. In addition, when 
observing literacy and general knowledge, it became apparent 
that the German children lacked the proper education due to the 
former emphasis placed on Nazi indoctrination rather than on 
core teachings. Further, democratization required qualified 
teachers who were not former Nazi Party members:
In view of the great political responsibility towards the 
German youth and future, the prospective teachers are 
required—and this point is expressively stressed by the 
TÄGLICHE RUNDSCHAU, the paper of the Soviet 
command—to belong to those classes of the German 
masses that are known for their democratic traditions 
33 Jarausch, After Hitler, 54. 
34 “Europe 1945: Number 2,” 5.
Furman Humanities Review
46
and leanings, namely the workers, the peasants and the 
working intelligentsia.35
The brutal stages of demilitarization, denazification, and 
democratization reflect the long, arduous process of recon-
structing Germany to overcome the brainwashing and indoctri-
nation employed by the Nazi Regime in their attempt to control 
all aspects of German society. 
Responses to Reeducation: Tracing Postwar Memory
The main problem in analyzing postwar memory is the si-
lence of many Germans during the democratization process 
extending into the 1950s and 1960s. Author Joachim Fest 
admitted that he would not have immediately put pen to paper, 
writing his precise early memories, if he had not had a radio 
commission to author his account of German history.36 In 
collectively working through his experiences, Fest termed the 
post-1945 period as “The Great Denial,” in which the “early 
years after the war was later described as a ‘communicative 
silence.’”37 This silence was formed not because of repression 
by the Allied forces but because of Germany’s determination to 
forget the horrors of their recent past. According to Tubach, 
“For mere physical and psychological survival, it was necessary 
for us to look forward; to look back meant facing a wall too 
high and formidable to be scaled.”38
Following World War II, German youths, especially older 
Hitler Youth members born before 1930, had become disorient-
ed by the reality of National Socialism and its subsequent 
destruction of Germany. Amidst the rubble and dilapidated 
towns of Germany, they felt lost without the Nazi authoritarian 
35 “Europe 1945: Number 2,” 29.
36 Joachim C. Fest, Not Me: Memoirs of a German Childhood,
trans. Martin Chalmers (London: Atlantic Books Ltd., 2012), 14.
37 Ibid., 354.
38 Tubach, German Voices, 100-101.
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ideology in which they were raised. Therefore, when the 
occupied German state was in the beginning stages of its 
democratic transformation, German youths actually protested 
against democratization. Initially, many of these adolescents 
remained loyal to the Führer and to National Socialism, 
believing that democracy would fail like it had with the Weimar 
Republic. Their resistance is evidence that actions in denazifi-
cation were ineffectively carried out in the beginning of the 
postwar period. Having been traumatized by the war, these 
youths clung to the ideals of Nazism, unwilling to admit their 
defeat.  The indoctrinated youths continued to claim in the 
summer of 1945, “Hitler was a great man who insisted that 
‘[Germans] have not really lost the war.’”39
Proud, nationalistic German youths sought to fight against 
Allied control. They believed the American occupiers threat-
ened to change the traditional social and political structures of 
German society and replace them with Americanized versions.  
Fisher states that there was contention between the Germans 
and Americans over Allied educational reforms that Germans 
believed would intrude upon other societal aspects of the 
German identity.  Drawing upon the American “Zook” Report, 
Fisher explains that Germans strongly protested proposed 
changes in the structure of German schools based on the 
American democratic model; this revealed “how youth and 
education afforded postwar Germans one last front on which to 
fight the Allies and on which to stake their identities.”40 The 
youthful resentment against this Allied control is also reflected 
by surveys in the U.S. zone.  The majority of Germans opposed 
denazification “in practice, most often because they felt that too 
many ‘small fish’ were being netted while the bigger ones were 
getting away.”41 Germans claimed that these democratic 
39 Jarausch, After Hitler, 31.
40 Fisher, Disciplining Germany, 72.  
41 Steven P. Remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and 
Denazification of a German University (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 151.
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policies carried out by the occupiers were ignorant of the 
realities of postwar life in Germany.  In response to interview 
questions, Erich Neumeier stated that he believed the Marshall 
Plan, an American initiative that aided to help rebuild postwar 
Western Europe, had good intentions but was poorly organized 
and lacked understanding of the German people, customs, and 
beliefs. This was evidenced in the corn that was sent as a food 
ration to the starving German people—however, “in Germany 
corn is strictly food for picks [pigs]. So in Germany, Bavarian 
people thought the Americans think of us as [pigs].”42  Despite 
their need for such aid, the majority of German youth were 
attempting to retain their sense of nationalistic pride for their 
country, even in ruins, unwilling to lose their dignity in the face 
of such calamity. 
Although the former Nazi youth initially protested against 
democratization procedures, they also felt betrayed by Hitler 
and the Third Reich. While in the organization, Hitler Youth 
members became inspired by the German nationalist pride 
presented in their ritualistic activities and elaborate spectacles 
celebrating Nazism and Hitler’s leadership. Hitler became the 
archetype of National Socialism whom all the young boys and 
girls placed on a pedestal—as a father figure, he mattered more 
than Nazi ideology.43 Upon swearing their oath of fealty to the 
Führer in a ceremonial fashion, the members cast Hitler in a 
magical charismatic aura and thereby were inspired by his 
majesty; this is just one example of the effect of Nazi pageantry 
employed by the organization. Heck discusses an event where 
Hitler gave his speech to all the Hitler Youth members, who 
were overcome with emotion in hearing him speak; in that 
moment, Heck “belonged to Adolf Hitler body and soul.”44
Their admiration for Hitler and the Nazi ideal turned to shock 
when Germany collapsed and suffered through the postwar 
period. 
42 Neumeier, “Interview,” 4.
43 Tubach, German Voices, 43. 
44 Heck, Child of Hitler, 23.  
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Having been convinced of the invincibility of their Führer, 
Nazi Regime, and organization, Hitler Youth members ques-
tioned why Hitler’s Third Reich failed so miserably against the 
Allied powers. As the Nazi organization failed to protect them 
when they suffered from postwar depression, German youths 
began to portray themselves as victims rather than perpetrators 
of Nazi actions, hence Grass’ observation: “The crimes coming 
to light with peace, the flip side of war, were making victims 
out of perpetrators.”45 The victimization of the Hitler Youth 
kept them from admitting to themselves and others their 
complicity in furthering the Nazi cause against the Jews, raising 
the question of whether or not they were blameless. Although 
the Hitler Youth members often naively participated in their 
activities without fully understanding the actual indirect 
purposes—the effects of displaying power and superiority over 
younger members, for example—they were ultimately indoctri-
nated into having a sense of a strong nationalistic and racial 
superiority.  
In the postwar period, they were held accountable for their 
actions against the Jewish race, regardless of their indoctrina-
tion as youths. According to historian Tony Judt, postwar 
Germany had been democratized and “raised to see Nazism as 
responsible for war and defeat; but its truly awful aspects were 
consistently downplayed.”46 When the Adolf Eichmann trial 
occurred in 1960 in Jerusalem along with the Auschwitz trials 
later in Frankfurt, the German public became exposed to the 
evils of the Nazi regime. German youth radicals of the 1960s 
then began to claim that the Bonn Republic in West Germany 
actively sought to cover crimes formerly committed by Nazi 
youths and failed to allow Germans to confront their past—”as
a result, in the eyes of their sons and daughters they stood for 
nothing. Their material achievements were tainted by their 
45 Grass, Peeling the Onion, 240.  
46 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2005), 416.  
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moral inheritance.”47 These postwar protests represent the guilt 
former Nazi youths faced as a refusal of taking responsibility. 
Erich Neumeier admitted having “troubles being classified as a 
‘Nazi’ criminal,” mainly because he, like many other German 
youths, felt that “I was doing the same as the American GIs –
defending my country.”48 However, as Günter Grass explains in 
his memoir, “Guilt—whether proven, presumed, or con-
cealed—remains. . . .  It says its piece, fears no repetition, is 
mercifully forgotten for a time, and hibernates in our dreams.”49
The negative attitudes of the German youths impacted the 
reception towards democratization as a failure in the short term, 
making it initially difficult to undo the damage of Nazi indoc-
trination. Former Hitler Youth members who became Allied 
prisoners of war felt bitter resentment in losing to the Allies and 
were dehumanized through their experiences as Nazi fighting 
machines. For instance, Heck was captured by French military 
occupiers, who sent him to a penitentiary in Wittlich as a 
prisoner of war when they found out he was a Hitler Youth 
leader (Bannführer). He went through a process of reeducation, 
recalling a time when he viewed documentary films of death 
camps with indifference: 
The mountains of emaciated corpses had the opposite 
effect from what our conquerors intended. We thought 
they were fakes, posed to indict all Germans. The 
French became so incensed by our indifference that they 
rammed us with rifle butts. It was some time before I 
could accept the truth of the Holocaust, nearly three 
decades more before I could write or speak about 
German guilt and responsibility.50
In a similar way, Günter Grass faced the challenges as a POW 
when there were rumors that prisoners would be transferred to 
47 Ibid., 417.
48 Neumeier, “Interview,” 4.
49 Grass, Peeling the Onion, 28.  
50 Heck, Child of Hitler, 204-205.
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the Soviet zone—great fear struck the hearts of many prisoners. 
Grass also mentioned “rumors of a mass release of prisoners, 
occasionally combined with talk of shipping the youngest 
inmates off for reeducation: to America! They’ll knock the 
Hitler Youth out of you, the older soldiers jeered.”51 The harsh 
scare tactics that the Allies instigated began to influence the 
POWs, who were radically changed through the reeducation 
process—”completely unprepared for a West Germany in the 
throes of rapid economic growth and expansion, POWs 
appeared as sage observers from another age.”52
The German youths encountered in their postwar lives a 
stage of reexamination of their values, focusing mainly on their 
present survival rather than speaking out on their atrocities as 
Nazi youths. Having been let down by the fall of the Third 
Reich and rejection by the Allies as Nazi criminals, the youths 
distrusted their older authorities. As the Nazi foundations that 
they wholeheartedly followed became destroyed, the youths 
were unsure of where to place their faith; they therefore 
frequently withdrew from the community and maintained a
focus only within themselves.53 These youths displayed a 
disinterest towards government matters, taking no sides in party 
politics regarding democracy, Nazism, or otherwise — “by
all accounts most Germans were intent on one thing, das 
Überleben, or mere survival, and Allied armies were grappling 
to impose a victor’s order on the wartime chaos.”54 However, 
their social adaptation in a postwar Germany that was slowly 
becoming renewed as a nationalist state influenced the evolu-
tion of their ideals over time. Algot Joensson, who became a 
national director of an affiliate of the Swedish Trade Union 
Federation in 1941, provided his perspective on democracy 
51 Grass, Peeling the Onion, 188.  
52 Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable 
Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001), 90.
53 Kater, Hitler Youth, 257. 
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when compiling an observational report of the Bavarian areas 
struck by postwar devastation.  He urgently called for the 
creation of democracy to rebuild Germany, an initiative that 
would be led by its youth, and argued for trade unions to 
become the “core of democracy.”55 His argument sought to 
train youth to become progressive contributors in rebuilding the 
German society and aiding in its democratic development: this 
call was made “in order to be able to reach a judgment on a 
problem, [the German youth] will demand facts and, eventual-
ly, they will learn respect for facts, for the view of other people 
and for people themselves—a respect which is quite necessary 
in a democracy.”56
German youths in the western zones were also influenced 
by democratic youth organizations, which were headed by the 
Education and Religious Affairs Branch with foreign military 
officials guiding their activities.57 According to the U.S. 
military’s program guidelines, the democratization process in 
these organizations would be “achieved by acquainting the 
young people with such activities and interests as woodcrafts 
and athletics that were normal to youths of similar age in the 
United States.”58 One German youth, Manfred Fischer, who 
was chosen to participate in this re-indoctrination process, 
loved this experience, in which “good food, fireside meetings, 
talks about America, and simple interactions with the American 
soldiers in charge of the youth camp filled the days.”59 These 
55 Algot Joensson, Organized Labor and Democracy in Ger-
many, Office of the Military Government for Germany (U.S.), 
Manpower Division, Visiting Expert Series No. 15, October 1949,
University of Wisconsin, The History Collection Database, 9. 
56 Ibid., 14.
57 The U.S. Armed Forces German Youth Activities Program,
Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 
1956, University of Wisconsin The History Collection Database, 2. 
58 Ibid., 5. 
59 Tubach, German Voices, 153. Upon the arrival of American 
soldiers occupying German territory, Fischer had lived with 
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organizations represented a quasi-Hitlerjugend that encouraged 
the spread of democracy rather than the Nazi cause. Most 
importantly, they helped to guide former Hitler Youths to 
eventually find their way toward democracy in a newly 
developed Germany and, thus, to move Germany toward the 
healing of its psyche. 
Legacy of Democratization in Postwar Germany
One major effect stemming from the democratization pro-
cess was the fracturing of unity between East and West Germa-
ny. Differences occurred in democratization procedures of the 
Eastern zone of Russia and the Western zones of America, 
Britain, and France that almost hindered the growth of a new 
German nationalism. According to German intellectuals, 
Germany suffered from “post-fascist democratic deficit” in 
which they sought to create stronger democratic institutions that 
pushed against totalitarianism, but struggled to identify with 
them.60 With American influences, West Germany actively 
pursued an effective democracy, modeled differently from the 
pre-Nazi Weimar Republic, to combat against Nazism; this 
zone became increasingly westernized.  Conversely, Russia’s 
ruthless denazification process created in the East German zone 
“a seemingly ‘more German Germany’ steeped in authoritarian-
ism.”61 For instance, the Free German Youth (FDJ) was 
established as a youth organization similar to those in the 
Western zones but with communist purposes. While the 
organization sought to convert its young members by including 
“fun into their activities, using some of the same techniques as 
the Hitler Youth,” its main focus was to develop the political 
American GIs, who used his home for U.S. Army Headquarters; 
he created a bond and admiration for these Americans despite their 
takeover. 
60 Müller, Another Country, 9. 
61 Ibid.
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education system based on socialism.62 This cruel re-
indoctrination and aggression of Communists on Eastern 
Germany is reflected in the tales of German refugees who 
managed to escape from the Eastern zone during the postwar 
period—”forcefully separated from their homes and posses-
sions, they desperately needed immediate assistance to com-
pensate them for their losses and integrate them into West 
German society.”63 As Erich Neumeier expressed, even as a 
member of the Hitler Youth he did not have much concern for 
politics or perceptions of the Jews before the postwar period. 
But following the war, his perceptions and concerns were 
confused and illustrated the mindset of many Germans: 
I was not interested in politics. That the stores of Jews 
were marked as “Ich Bin Ein Jude” was a fact of daily 
life and really not much concern to me. After the war, 
after the Koncentration camp stories became public, I 
became uncomfortable. But I ask myself what happened 
to the German prisoners of war in Russia? Even up to 
date only 20-25% were returned. The rest disappeared 
forever . . . and Russia was an alliance of the West!64
The statistics that Neumeier mentioned foreshadow the fact that 
in the wake of World War II, the Soviet Union was creating a 
Communist, totalitarian government in its occupied zone of 
Eastern Germany rather than aiding in democratization. Thus, 
the differences between East and West German political 
ideologies served to further divide Germany and confuse its 
citizens who were often already lost: in denial, emotionally 
distraught, and “uncomfortable” with what had transpired under 
Hitler’s Regime.  
62 Catherine Plum, Antifascism After Hitler: East German 
Youth and Socialist Memory, 1949-1989 (New York: Taylor and 
Francis Group, Routledge, 2015), 46.  
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64 Neumeier, “Interview,” 2-3.
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Despite the deep political divisions within East and West 
Germany, the overall process of democratization throughout 
Germany effectively helped restore over time a new German 
nation that had formerly been ravaged by postwar crisis. 
American foreign occupiers established their influence and new 
organizations, such as the Social Democratic Party led by 
politicians like Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who sought to 
improve the nation’s postwar government. As a result, Germa-
ny eventually transformed into a developed and, once again 
advanced, nation. Erich Neumeier had moved away from 
Germany in 1954, due to the slow recovery of the national 
economy. He established his home in the United States, where 
prosperity and “easy money” kept him from returning to 
Germany. However, after fifteen to twenty years, he arrived in 
Germany again, only to find its massive transformation. Erich 
and his wife “felt we did not belong the[re] anymore. Only my 
brot[h]ers family was importend [important]. Most of our 
friends had moved and were not in Ingolstadt anymore.”65 With 
the transformation of the West German nation came the 
transformation of its youth, who eventually understood and 
accepted the evils of Nazism and began to work through their 
guilt and embarrassment.  The processes of denazification and 
democratization were necessary for Germans to come to terms 
with their past, helping them become a stronger nation in facing 
the consequences for their actions—in doing so, “acknowl-
edgement of their losses unified West Germans; it became 
central to defining the Federal Republic as a nation of vic-
tims.”66 In eventually accepting their responsibility for Nazi 
atrocities, many former Hitler Youths were able to record 
accounts of their perspectives towards Nazism and democracy, 
as the past was no longer painful. Their responses helped 
Germany move one step closer towards successful democratiza-
tion in the long term.  
65 Neumeier, “Interview,” 4-5. 
66 Moeller, War Stories, 22.
Furman Humanities Review
56
Conclusion
While the initial development of democratization was an 
ineffective failure in the short term, it gradually gained success,
as the new West German nation evolved economically and 
politically due to the efforts of groups like labor unions and 
former Hitler Youth who had come to terms, as best as they 
could, with what had occurred during the war. 
These former Hitler Youth members began to heal and 
work toward uniting the new German youth in their efforts to 
democratize Germany. The Hitler Youth’s indoctrination into 
National Socialism effectively trained its members as soldiers 
for the Third Reich. Yet according to former members Alfons 
Heck and Luftwaffe pilot Erich Neumeier, the organization’s 
appeal for them lay in athletics and social fellowship, which 
used the naiveté of its members to carry out the Nazi cause.  
After World War II and Nazi atrocities wreaked havoc on 
Europe and the Nazi state collapsed, former Hitler Youth 
members struggled to return to normalcy, initially rejecting 
Allied efforts of democratization in the process. Nevertheless, 
decades of demilitarization, denazification, reconstruction, and 
democratization, whether through other youth organizations or 
experiences in POW camps, helped fully convince Germany’s 
youth of the positive values of democracy. By accepting and 
taking responsibility for their actions, the former Hitler Youth 
helped Germany emerge out of the economic and political 
wreckage of World War II to become a new democratic nation. 
Hitler successfully indoctrinated the German youth and 
believed he would through them secure Germany’s future in 
National Socialism; however, as postwar Germany rose from its 
devastation, so too did its people as they learned to remember, 
rather than forget their past—”Memory likes to play hide-and-
seek, to crawl away. . . .   When pestered with questions, 
memory is like an onion that wishes to be peeled so we can 
read what is laid bare letter by letter.”67 Nevertheless, the youth 
67 Grass, Peeling the Onion, 3. 
Elizabeth Fox
57
of Germany, which formerly symbolized the Nazi cause, 
became the true hope for Germany in its democratization and 
its steps toward healing the German spirit. 
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